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Abstract 
 
My thesis examines causes and consequences of gender pay gap at the 
CEO level in a statistically representative sample of selected stock 
exchange listed companies in the USA using publicly available data.  
 
With my statistical analysis, I was investigating the influence of company 
size and profitability on cash compensation of CEOs. Observation period 
was from 1991 until 2008. My research confirms the fact that females are 
still underrepresented at CEO positions in U.S. publicly traded companies, 
both in terms of observations as well as in absolute numbers. Over the 
period under study these numbers have increased, but both are in 1-digit 
range. Raw gender gap was 23%, proving that females are still earning 
less than their male colleagues. According to my regression analysis which 
was investigating only cash compensation, while controlling for various 
company related characteristics such as size and profitability, has 
delivered result for gender pay gap in the range between -31% up to 
+12,5%. Further extension of models with CEO characteristics would help 
to narrow down the results.     
 
 
  
  
  
  
Zusammenfassung  
 
In meiner Diplomarbeit habe ich die Ursachen und Folgen der 
geschlechtsbedingten Lohnunterschiede bei den CEOs in einer statistisch 
repräsentativen Stichprobe von ausgewählten börsennotierten 
Unternehmen in den USA untersucht.  
 
Anhand meiner statistischen Analyse, wurde der Einfluss der Firmengröße 
und –profitabilität auf die Geldkompensation der Vorstandsprecher erfasst. 
Der Beobachtungszeitraum erstreckte sich über die Jahre 1991 bis 2008. 
Zusätzlich bestätigen meine Nachforschungen die Tatsache, dass Frauen 
in Führungspositionen bei US-börsennotierten Unternehmen immer noch 
unterrepräsentiert sind, sowohl in der Anzahl als auch im Anteil. Im 
Beobachtungszeitraum haben sich beide dieser Kennzahlen vergrößert, 
bewegen sich jedoch noch immer im einstelligen Bereich. In absoluten 
Zahlen verdienen Frauen 23% weniger als ihre männlichen Kollegen. Die 
von mir durchgeführten Regressionsanalysen zur Barbezahlung, haben 
einen geschlechterspezifischen Gehaltsunterschied im Bereich von -31% 
bis +12% gezeigt. Die Analysen kontrollierten die Faktoren wie 
Barbezahlung, firmenbezogene Eigenschaften, Firmengröße und –
profitabilität. Diese Ergebnisse wären weiter eingrenzbar, wenn das 
statistische Modell um die perönliche Merkmale der Vorstandssprecher 
erweitert werden könnte. 
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1 Introduction  
 
There are several reasons why I chose the topic of gender pay gap for my 
thesis. I was brought up and schooled in former Yugoslavia, at that time a 
country with a socialist plan economy with strong emphasis on gender 
equality in all aspects of life. Both in my immediate family and in the wider 
community, I could observe female leaders in prominent positions and it 
would have never occurred to me that it could or should work any other 
way - both because of my upbringing and education and because of the 
many examples of successful, professional women in my surroundings.  
I gathered my first professional experiences working for international 
humanitarian organizations in Vienna, but also in Bosnia, Iran and Jordan. 
Differences in treatment of national and international staff I could witness 
at times were very disturbing to me. What was even more disturbing, 
however, was the fact that women were treated differently than men in the 
professional context even in the most developed economies in the world. 
To me, this meant that the very basic idea of social justice, whereby equal 
pay is paid for equal work, was hurt. I was outraged and wanted to find 
possible explanations for this injustice, if any where available.  
Ideally, it would have been interesting to me to examine the causes and 
consequences of gender pay gap in the countries where I live or have 
strong ties to: Austria or countries of former Yugoslavia. However, finding 
relevant data on this phenomenon in Europe proved to be almost 
impossible, which caused me to change my focus to the stock exchange 
listed companies in the USA with strong disclosure requirements. More 
specifically, my focus will be on the gender pay gap at the level of Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) in a statistically representative sample of selected 
companies. One of the most important reasons for concentrating on such a 
small and homogenous group is the basic assumption that there are fewer 
differences in observed characteristics in the human capital of this narrow 
group compared to the highly heterogeneous broad work force. In general, 
it can be assumed that CEOs form a relatively homogenous group of 
people with a similar education level, professional experience, human 
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capital and also similar unobserved characteristics like motivation and 
career orientation. Also, data available on CEO pay levels for New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) listed companies is publicly available and much 
more reliable than similar data on their counterparts in other parts of the 
world.  
Therefore, I use a sample of CEOs from US companies. Data collected in 
this paper are from the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
website1, Data were analysed for the period between 19912 and 2008. In 
total, there are 1367 observations (CEO years) with 225 unique CEOs, 17 
out of which are females, for a total number of 86 unique companies. 
The thesis is organized as follows: after a brief introduction, describing 
general issues of compensation in general and executive compensation in 
particular, I am, in Section 3, providing a glimpse into the theoretical and 
historical overview of gender pay gap and related research. Data and 
variables used in the research are explained in Section 4. The empirical 
study on executive compensation in USA is presented in Section 5. Further 
sections include: conclusion, list of acronyms, references, tabulated 
statistical results and a data appendix. 
 
                                                 
1
 http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html 
2
 Earlier data was not available at SEC website 
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2 Compensation  
2.1  Overview  
 
The issue of compensation in general and gender-related compensation 
specifically is a very broad and complicated one. I will only try to briefly 
mention some of the most important historical turning points in the 
discussion of work compensation and the disparity of income between men 
and women.  
Through most of the history, women were almost exclusively focused on 
domestic and child-rearing duties and have not been expected or even 
allowed to engage in any economic activity outside of the home, especially 
not in those kind of activities which would generate income.  
The first, and for the longest time the only exception to this rule were 
women conducting religious ceremonies. Priestesshood functions were 
used to carve out space for women in patriarchal societies. Priestesses 
enjoyed rights and liberties denied to most women, such as their own 
property and income, freedom of movement and the prestige of public 
office.  
Some Greek priestesses, for instance, received a share of the harvest and 
other wealth. The Vestals of Rome enjoyed freedom from male oversight in 
managing their affairs.3  
 
One justification for unequal treatment of men and women in terms of the 
value of their work can be found in the Bible:  
 “Speak unto the children of Israel and say unto them: When a man shall 
clearly utter a vow in person unto the Lord, according to thy evaluation, 
then thy evaluation shall be for a male from 20 years old unto 60 years old, 
even thy evaluation shall be 50 shekels of silver, after the shekel of the 
sanctuary. And if the speaker be a female, then thy evaluation shall be 30 
shekels,” Leviticus 27:24 
 
                                                 
3
 http://www.suppressedhistories.net/articles/priestesses.html 
4
 Via Fuchs (1971) 
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In Europe, the Church prohibited women's religious leadership, but it 
persisted for centuries in witchcraft and folk religion.  
Islam introduced significant changes in the socio-economical standing of 
women and enabled their more prominent and proactive role in society, 
securing, among other things, their rights to own property.  
“The Quran explains that men and women are equal in creation and in the 
afterlife, but not identical. In the Caliphate, both men and women were 
involved in diverse occupations and economic activities. Women were 
employed in a wide range of commercial activities and diverse 
occupations: as farmers, construction workers, dyers, spinners, etc.), but 
also as investors, doctors, nurses, brokers, lenders, scholars, etc. 
Medieval Muslim hospitals commonly employed female nurses. Muslim 
women also held a monopoly over certain branches of the textile industry, 
the largest and most specialized and market-oriented industry at the time, 
in occupations such as spinning, dyeing, and embroidery. Muslim hospitals 
were also the first to employ female physicians.”5  
 
Female property rights and wage labour were relatively uncommon in 
Europe until the Industrial Revolution in the 18th and 19th centuries. 
The Industrial Revolution was partially fuelled by the economic necessity of 
many women to increase their family’s income by working outside the 
home, often in the mills or coal mines. Still, most women found jobs in 
domestic service, textile factories, and piece workshops. For some, the 
Industrial Revolution provided independent wages, mobility and a better 
standard of living. For the majority, however, factory work in the early years 
of the 19th century resulted in a life of hardship. Men assumed supervisory 
roles over women and received higher wages. Some new work roles and 
protest outlets, including feminism, developed by 1914.6  
 
“The proportion of married women engaged in paid work in the United 
States increased more than tenfold during the past century, from less than 
5% in 1890 to more than 60%! Much of the increased employment 
                                                 
5
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women_in_Islam 
6
 http://www.schoolshistory.org.uk/IndustrialRevolution/womenandchildren.htm 
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occurred in the years after 1940, and the 1940's mark an apparent break 
with the past in terms of women's work” (Goldin, 1989) 
 
The World War I mobilized women into the civilian work force to replace 
dead or conscripted men. Women were called on to do work and take on 
roles that were outside the traditional gender expectations. As well as paid 
employment, women were also expected to take on voluntary work such as 
knitting clothes and preparing hampers for soldiers on the front. In Great 
Britain, women were working in factories making ammunition and farming 
the land.  
During World War II, approximately 400,000 women served with in the 
Army of the United States. Nineteen million American women filled out the 
home front labor force, not only in war factory jobs, especially in aviation, 
but in transportation, agricultural, and every type of office work. Women 
joined the federal government in massive numbers. Additionally, female 
volunteers contributed to the war effort by planting victory gardens, 
canning produce, selling war bonds, donating blood, salvaging needed 
commodities and sending care packages. At first, most American men 
were reluctant to allow women into traditional male jobs, but women 
proved that they could not only do the job but in some instances they did it 
better than their male counterparts.  
 
Once females were in the workforce different reason led them to keep 
working. Goldin (1989) argues that WWII was not solely responsible for the 
continuing participation of females in work force. Increase in clerical jobs, 
decline in working hours, increased real wages as well as declining fertility 
rates were also responsible. Even after the War, due to the still dominant 
traditional division of labor in the family, women primarily focus on 
childcare and housework and therefore have less time and effort available 
for working outside the home. The re-installation of a clear distinction 
between male and female dominated jobs could be noted as soon as the 
need to substitute men in active military service subsided.  
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Even as late as the 1960ies, 1970ies, the focus of working women was 
more on gaining access to different kinds of employment and not so much 
on the level of their compensation.  
The distinction between male and female dominated jobs was maybe not 
so clear in countries with formerly socialist economies, such as in former 
Yugoslavia. Some of the more prominent manifestations of the proclaimed 
equality of men and women were in the labor market, were some women 
were holding prominent managerial spots, and a concept of a different 
remuneration of their work was unheard of at that time.  
During the 1980ies, the term “glass ceiling” was introduced do describe 
"the seen, yet unbreachable barrier that keeps minorities and women from 
rising to the upper rungs of the corporate ladder, regardless of their 
qualifications or achievements.”7 The difficulties in the professional 
advancement of above mentioned groups had, of course, a direct impact 
on their compensation level. This only demonstrates the complexity of the 
gender pay gap issue. 
 
2.2 Executive Compensation  
 
Most recently, especially since the global financial and economic crisis, 
executive compensation became a contagious topic broadly and almost 
constantly discussed in all media outlets and on various levels.8,9,10,11 The 
focus of these discussions has very often been on annual bonuses paid to 
CEOs and top-level managers, which have very often been publically 
perceived as exorbitant.  
One of the misconceptions about executive compensation is that CEOs 
and other top-tier managers solely make direct decisions about their own 
compensation. Usually, the executive compensation is decided by so 
                                                 
7
 Recommendations of the Federal Glass Ceiling Commission Washington, D.C. 
November 1995 http://www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/history/reich/reports/ceiling2.pdf 
8
 http://www.wsws.org/articles/2006/dec2006/blan-d22.shtml 
9
 http://www.eurasiareview.com/27082012-were-all-subsidizing-free-lunches-for-americas-
ceos-oped/ 
10
 http://www.usatoday.com/money/companies/management/story/2011-11-07/100-
million-dollar-chairmen/51116304/1 
11
 http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2006-08-21/sec-shoves-executive-pay-into-the-
spotlightbusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice 
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called compensation committees. Such committees consist of outside 
members of the board of directors.  
Companies own human resources department usually proposes the initial 
compensation, which is normally sets in such a way as to reflect the 
company size and at least partially match similar packages offered by 
relevant peer companies, which are not necessarily within the same 
industry. Future performance of the company is also a major factor in 
determining performance related component of the CEO compensation.  
Nevertheless, the fact that the initial salary proposal is submitted by a 
department in the direct chain of command of the CEO causes this process 
appearing in a less then transparent light. Murphy (1999) has dedicated a 
full chapter to a very detailed description of this process.  
2.2.1 Components  
 
According to New York Stock Exchange rules, every listed company has to 
publish the earnings of their five most compensated executives in their 
proxy statements. According to Murphy (1999), most compensation 
packages consist of the following components:  
- Base salary 
- Stock options 
- Annual bonuses 
- Long term incentive plans 
 
The base salary is usually based on similar salaries in relevant peer 
companies. It represents the fixed portion of the compensation. Stock 
options are tied to some vesting period and aim at motivating managers to 
stay with the company for a longer time period. Annual bonuses are tied to 
the company’s short-term performance. Typically, such plans have several 
threshold values in terms of company’s performance. Based on achieved 
targets, a different percentage of the agreed bonus is paid out. Long-term 
incentive plans include restricted stock plans, multi-year accounting-based 
performance plans as well as retirement plans. As of 2006, most 
companies have replaced bonuses with “non-equity incentive plan 
compensation” for tax reasons. Compared to bonuses, non-equity 
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incentive plans are considered to be performance based according to IRS 
rules12 and therefore fully deductible. (Balsam, 2012)      
The importance of each component might vary across different industries 
and over time. The major portion of the increase of the total CEO 
compensation can be attributed to the increased portion of stock options 
and their grant-date values. In general, stock options have become the 
largest portion of all compensation packages in almost all industries. The 
largest increase in average compensation is, not surprisingly, noticed in 
financial industries. (Murphy, 1999)  
For my empirical study, I have used cash compensation only, consisting of 
the base salary, the annual bonus and other annual compensation, since 
calculating the value of stock options and stock ownership would have 
exceed the scope of this paper. 
  
                                                 
12
 Section 162 (m) 
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3 Gender pay gap  
 
The OECD defines the gender pay gap as the difference between male 
and female earnings expressed as a percentage of male earnings13.  
The European Commission defines it as the average difference between 
men’s and women’s hourly earnings.14  
The gender pay gap is usually measured as the ratio of female to male 
median yearly earnings among full-time, year-round (FTYR) workers.  
Critics of the hourly-based definition emphasize that currently, less than 
50% of the workforce in US is paid on hourly basis15. The situation in most 
European countries will be similar.    
Most broadly, the gender pay gap has been attributed to differences in 
personal and workplace characteristics between women and men 
(education, hours worked, occupation etc.), as well as direct and indirect 
discrimination in the labor market (gender stereotypes, customer and 
employer bias etc.) 
 
3.1 Scientific explanations and concepts 
 
Today, there are countless studies and surveys dealing with gender pay 
gap and proving that females are being paid less for the same work than 
males. According to Blau et al. (2000) based on weekly earnings of full 
time employees, between 1950s and 1970s the ratio was at 60%16. In next 
three decades it increased to 76,5 %. Same is observed in different 
countries all over the world: “Yet pay differentials persist in all countries 
ranging from 10 to 30 percentage points.” (Wirth, 2002)17 Similar observations 
are made for more specific and homogenous groups like a study of UK 
academic labor market conducted by Booth et al., (2005). 
 
                                                 
13
 http://www.oecd.org/social/familiesandchildren/38752746.pdf 
14
 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/gender-pay-gap/index_en.htm 
15
 http://www.pay-equity.org/info-opposition.html 
16
 Page 76 
17
 Page 3 
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These studies tried to address this issue from various perspectives and 
find answers to questions such as: what causes the gender pay gap in 
general, and in the executive compensation in particular, how significant is 
it, what are the best approaches to counter it, etc.  
Most of the research on gender pay gap are broad studies that do not 
concentrate on special target groups. However, there are several 
exceptions, like Bertrand et al. (2000); Kirchmeyer (2002); Yurtoglu et al. 
(2007), which all concentrate on managerial positions. There have also 
been several studies on gender pay gap within academic ranks like 
Gander (1997). One related study by Wenneras et al. (1997) examined the 
peer-review system in scientific journals, which is regarded as a highly 
objective process. Still, the study has demonstrated that female applicants 
for grants with same amount of impact points were given much less 
competence points than their male counterparts, without any obvious 
reason. 
While all studies confirm the existence of the gender pay gap and its 
significance, the explanations to its causes and proposed to solutions to its 
complete bridging or at least it´s reduction are vastly different. As can been 
read in Gender global report for 200918, most economies and countries 
have acknowledged the existence of gender pay gap as a problem and are 
using different approaches in trying to deal with it.   
Several different approaches try to offer explanations as to causes of and 
mechanisms behind gender pay gap. Some argue that, if the gender pay 
gap existed, companies would be well advised to replace their male 
employees with female ones and by doing so, significantly reduce labour 
costs (Farrell, 1993). Due to the fact that companies still prefer to hire 
males, the implication could be that the gender gap does not exist. This 
argument would, of course, be valid for any kind of discrimination, not only 
regarding gender. At first glance, this argument seems very logical, but 
there are several problems with it.  
First of all, labour and hiring markets are imperfect. Individuals have 
certain sets of qualifications and characteristics and may not transit easily 
from one job to another.  Also, firing one employee and hiring a new one 
                                                 
18
 https://members.weforum.org/pdf/gendergap/report2009.pdf 
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creates transitional costs, but it also causes hidden monetary and non-
monetary expenses as well as potential productivity loses during the 
training and is therefore not necessarily attractive for the employer. Of 
course, even if employers would decide to replace all male workers with 
female ones, there are simply not enough females to cover all currently 
male-held jobs.   
The mechanisms used to counter-balance both causes and consequences 
of gender pay gap vary significantly across geographic areas and depend 
on the socio-economical system, as well as the cultural and legal heritage 
of each country. The 2009 report concludes that the gender pay gap is 
generally closing, but this is still not happening at the necessary and 
desired speed. “Out of the 115 countries that have been covered in 2006, 
2007, 2008 and 2009, 97 countries—over 80%—have improved their 
performance over the last four years, while 18 have shown widening gaps.”  
Also, it emphasises that there is no universal solution to the gender pay 
gap problem.  
Apparent male advantages in the workplace, both those expressed in 
monetary and non-monetary terms, cannot be explained with a single 
approach. Gender pay gap is a complex interaction between many factors 
which are still rather hard to fully understand and explain. Different human 
capital qualifications, maternity laws, apparent discrimination by employees 
or customer level discrimination, different household obligations due to 
sociological and cultural norms are just few factors which can be used to 
explain the gender pay gap. Below, I will briefly mention the most important 
ones.  
 
3.1.1 Segregation  
 
The process in which one group of people is driven into certain kind of jobs 
is called segregation. In cases of a clear division between male and female 
dominated jobs (“pink collar”), we speak of horizontal or occupational 
segregation. Obvious examples for female dominated jobs would be flight 
attendants, child care, health care, administrative assistance and teaching.  
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Horizontal segregation is very important in connection with the gender pay 
gap, as “female jobs” are usually less paid then “male jobs” (England, 
1982; England et al., 1988). Typically “female jobs” are paid less even if 
the scope of the position, related responsibility and performed tasks are 
the same as in a typically “male job”. Due to the fact that the pay 
discrimination in this case is against a whole occupation, this implies that a 
male working in a female dominated job will also get paid less. This effect 
is also called “evaluative discrimination” (Achatz et al., 2004).  
 
Vertical segregation is a situation in which females are underrepresented 
at certain hierarchical levels. “The situation where gender pay gaps are 
typically wider at the top of the wage distribution is known as the ‘glass 
ceiling’. It is one of the most compelling metaphors recently used for 
analysing inequality between men and women in the workplace, to 
describe a barrier to further advancement once women have attained a 
certain level. They can see their male counterparts promoted while they 
are not.” (Kee, 2005) 
At this stage, it is worth mentioning two terms related to vertical 
segregation: “glass walls” and “sticky floors”. 
According to Wirth (2002) glass walls are described as: “A significant 
problem contributing to the difficulties facing women to reach the top 
seems to be the fact that few senior women are in the so-called “line” 
positions that involve profit-and-loss or revenue generating responsibilities 
and which are critical for advancement to the highest levels.” 
“In contrast, the ‘sticky floor’ can be viewed as the opposite scenario of the 
‘glass ceiling’, when the gaps widen at the bottom of the wage distribution. 
Booth et al. (2003) defined it as a situation arising where otherwise 
identical men and women might be appointed to the same pay scale or 
rank, but the women are appointed at the bottom and men further up the 
scale.“  (Kee, 2005) 
It is a known fact that the number of high-ranking female managers is very 
low.  Bell (2005) has shown that even if a female accomplishes to be one 
of the five most paid officers in a company, the chances of her becoming a 
CEO are very small. However, the same  study has shown evidence for a 
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direct link between the chance of having a female CEO and the gender of 
members of the Board of Directors. Companies managed by women tend 
to have higher number of female executives than their peer companies 
managed by men.  
“…as women advance through ranks, differences in the treatment of men 
and women that arise from imperfect information about women’s abilities, 
as in “statistical discrimination” models (Phelps 1972, Aigner and Cane 
1977) and “pollution” models of discrimination (Goldin 2002), will narrow as 
more and better individual specific information is obtained. “  
 
Industrial segregation among managers has been researched by Farell 
et al. (2005). “Women are more likely to be managing companies that 
specialize in health and social services and in trade. These are also 
sectors where a disproportionate share of lower level managers are 
women, … On the other hand, very few women hold top-level positions in 
agriculture, construction, mining and in "heavy" manufacturing industries.“  
 
According to Polachek (1981) one of the explanations for the segregation 
is self-selection Due to their preference to choose jobs which are more 
“compatible” with family responsibilities and duties, females tend to self-
segregate themselves. Typical jobs would be part-time jobs, menial jobs 
and jobs with small human capital investment, which will be explained in 
this paper under 3.1.6. This argumentation is obvious for horizontal and 
industrial segregation. The resulting argument for explaining the vertical 
segregation looks as follows: if females were willing to commit full-time to 
their careers, their numbers in higher paid position would increase.   
England (1982) showed that, contrary to the self-selection theory, females 
planning to have children did not choose typical “female jobs” more 
frequently than other females. In addition, it has been proven that male-
dominated jobs actually have more flexibility and autonomy than female-
dominated jobs.  
The assumption that women choose lower-paid occupations hoping for the 
flexibility necessary to manage their family obligations is simply wrong. 
This has been proven by Glass (1990). “Finally, evidence here suggests 
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that predominantly female jobs are not necessarily jobs with characteristics 
that accommodate family responsibilities. On the contrary, workers in 
predominantly female jobs were less likely to report that their jobs were 
flexible or easy to perform.” 
 
3.1.2 Cumulative Causation 
 
The concept of “cumulative causation” was introduced by Myrdal (1944) 
when he used it to describe the impact of racial discrimination. It says that 
small, negative steps sum up over time and can make a huge difference in 
the end. In a short run, each time a person does not get promoted does not  
have to have a large effect on ones´ immediate income. However, if this 
happens more often compared to a person belonging to another group, at 
the end of the life-time, it will result in a large pay gap. 
In the research conducted by Wood et al. (1993) have examined the 
development of the pay gap of lawyers who graduated from University of 
Michigan Law School. Already at the beginning of their carriers, female 
lawyers were earning 7% less than their male colleagues. This can be 
partially explained by apparently less efficient initial salary negotiating skills 
of female graduates (Babcock, 2002). Another important finding from that 
study is those male students were willing to negotiate their starting salaries 
eight times more often than their female colleagues. Fifteen years into their 
carriers, the gap rose to 40%. Controlling for several factors like childbirth, 
grades and average working hours mainly due to motherhood obligations 
this gap reduces to 18%.  
According to Riley et al. (2002) in an environment which is lacking clear 
guidelines how evaluation should be conducted women were performing 
worse. In addition males were entering negotiation with higher targets and 
were achieving higher outcomes in mixed-gender pairs by 30%19. When 
females were negotiating on behalf of someone else, the performance gap 
was closed. This proves that females are not lacking negotiation skills, but 
maybe don’t feel entitled to demand higher value for them self.    
 
                                                 
19 Page 12 
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3.1.3 Gender Stereotypes and Bias  
 
Members of low-status groups (i.e. women, racial minorities) are subject to 
negative stereotypes and attributes concerning their work-related 
competences. Due to gender stereotypes and biased view of female 
abilities, especially in terms of leadership skills, females have it much 
harder to get to a top position job.  
According to Eagly et al. (2002) "perceived incongruity between the female 
gender role and leadership roles leads to two forms of prejudice: (a) 
perceiving women less favorably than men as potential occupants of 
leadership roles and (b) evaluating behavior that fulfils the prescriptions of 
a leader role less favorably when it is enacted by a woman." In addition, if 
and when they manage to enter high-status, male-dominated work 
settings, women are often subjected to tougher scrutiny than their male 
colleagues.  
Furthermore, research suggests that gender stereotypes, including “biased 
self-assessments” may be the main reason for occupational segregation, 
because they influence educational and career decisions. Correll (2001) 
has found that specific gender-related stereotypes, like saying that women 
have lower mathematical ability, influence a person’s perception of one’s 
own abilities and competence in terms of career relevant qualifications. 
She also argues that such patterns happen at very early stage in life cycle. 
“Since males and females appear to be voluntarily making career-relevant 
decisions that will carry them, on average, in substantially different 
occupational directions, it is important to examine these early stages in the 
supply-side process and ask why men and women make the choices they 
do.” 
As Guiso et al., (2008) have shown, performance gap is a “self-fulfilling 
prophecy”. In such countries where gender equality is high, like in Sweden, 
there is almost no gap. On the other hand, in countries like Turkey, this 
gap is present. This is mainly explained by self-biased self-assessment, as 
girls attend much less math classes than boys. 
 “While recognising the utility of preference theory in emphasising values, 
attitudes and personal preferences as potentially important determinants of 
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women’s labour market behaviour, it must be noted that this behaviour is 
influenced by learned cultural and social values that may be thought to 
discriminate against women (and sometimes against men) by stereotyping 
certain work and life styles as “male” or “female”. While women may rarely 
be offered work in particular occupations, because they do not have the 
appropriate education, their educational choices may be dictated, at least 
in part, by their expectations that these types of employment opportunities 
are not available to them, as well as by gender stereotypes that are 
prevalent in society.”20  
A further implication is that females and males have a different feeling for 
pay entitlement. Not surprisingly, males have much higher expectations. In 
addition, there is a link between lower status and expected entitlement 
(Hogue, 2003). Naturally this correlation is not solely reserved for females 
but also for minorities and other marginalised groups.   
 
There are several well-known examples that prove discrimination toward 
female employees. Most likely the most famous one is the “blind audition”, 
by now a standard procedure for all major orchestras. During the “blind 
audition”, musicians perform seated behind a screen securing their full 
anonymity. Neither their gender, nor their race or age is revealed during 
the audition. This most basic bio-data is normally revealed very early in the 
selection and hiring process – if not sooner, then by the time the person is 
interviewed. Goldin et al. (1997) have researched the impact of this 
procedure. According to their study, around 55% of the increase of female 
players in orchestras since 1970’s can be traced back to blind auditions 
alone.  
Another example is the “waiter experiment” (Neumark, 1996), which was 
conducted in Philadelphia, where men and women with identical CVs were 
applying for same jobs in the hospitality industry. A statistically significant 
evidence of discrimination against women was established. One possible 
explanation for this might be the reaction of employers to a customer level 
discrimination. 
                                                 
20
 OECD Employment Outlook 
2002.http://www.oecd.org/social/familiesandchildren/18960381.pdf 
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Similar results were found by Hekman et al. (2010) in so called Bookcoorp 
Study. Here, test persons who viewed video footage featuring actors of 
both genders pretending to be an employee helping a customer. The setup 
for both sides was highly controlled and equal in terms of the location, 
script and other environmental variables. This shows that customer ratings 
are not necessarily objective and should not be the only criteria for pay 
rises and promotions. We should note that male actors were favoured not 
only by male, but by female test persons as well. Full 38%21 of female 
tester found male actors better. 
 
3.1.4 Allocative discrimination 
 
Allocative discrimination describes the fact that the same work performed 
by individuals of different gender is valued and consequently paid 
differently (Achatz et al., 2004). According to Riddgeway (2001) employers 
are acting in discriminatory way towards their employees based on 
assumed gender related characteristics. This is valid for hiring, promotion 
and also for salary levels. Furthermore, people show significant preference 
for persons with similar characteristics. As a result, a male dominated 
management will prefer male candidates over equally qualified female 
ones. In a “reverse” environment Bell (2005) has shown that female-
managed companies tend to have a higher number of female executives 
then their peer companies managed by men. 
Basically, gender stereotypes assigning male persons with characteristic 
and competences such as leadership, deemed crucial for fulfilling 
managerial tasks, lead to devaluation of female achievements.  
“Prejudice against women as leaders and potential leaders would interfere 
with women´s ability to gain authority and exercise influence and would 
produce discrimination, when it is translated into personnel decision within 
organizations and political structures.”  (Carli et al., 2001)  
A very interesting study about work, earning and life experience of 
transsexuals before and after their gender transition has been conducted 
by Wiswall et al. (2006). Although transsexuals have the same human 
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capital before and after their transition, there are significant changes in 
their work authority and payment. “Existing autobiographical and scholarly 
research demonstrates that for many MTF22 transsexuals, becoming 
female brings a loss of authority and pay, as well as workplace harassment 
and, in many cases, termination. On the other hand, for many FTM23 
transsexuals, becoming a man can bring an increase in workplace 
authority, reward, and respect, as well as new job opportunities and 
promotions. Transsexuals’ before and after workplace experiences, then, 
can help make the hidden processes that produce workplace gender 
inequality visible.” Another finding of this study was that MTFs tend to 
commit to their gender transition later in their life, in order to enjoy the 
advantages of their “male career” as long as possible. On the other side, 
FTMs tend to do it early in their life, in order to diminish the disadvantages 
of a “female career”. 
 
3.1.5 Motherhood and Marriage  
 
It is a well-documented fact that females receive a statistically significant 
“motherhood penalty” on salary (Corell et al., 2007; Korenman et al., 
1992). This is valid even when controlled for reduced working hours, 
experience and educational level which might be a result of time 
consuming motherhood related tasks as well as interruptions in 
professional and educational careers (Waldfogel et al., 2000). 
Most first-world countries have some form of paternity leave, which should 
help to bridge this gap and equally distribute the workload related to rising 
children. “However, even in relatively gender-equal countries like Sweden, 
where parents are given 16 months of paid parental leave irrespective of 
gender, fathers take on average only 20% of the 16 months of paid 
parental and choose to transfer their days to their partner.”24  
                                                 
22
 MTF: male-to-female transsexual 
23
 FTM: female-to-male transsexual 
24
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Waldfogel (1998) has also shown that marriage status itself also has a 
negative effect to female wages. Single mothers are worse off, followed by 
married mothers and married women without children. She also showed 
that maternity leave narrows the gap as it raised the likelihood that females 
will return to same employer which in turn results in continued rise in 
wages. In numbers, 67%25 of mothers with proper coverage returned to 
their prior employer compared to 47% of mothers without such formal 
coverage.  
The economic risk and resulting costs of a woman possibly leaving jobs for 
a period of time or indefinitely to nurse a baby is cited by many to be a 
reason why women are less common in the higher paying occupations 
such as CEO positions and upper management. A further obstacle for 
mothers is that their chances to get hired are much lower than those of 
fully equal male candidates with children. This is also confirmed not only 
for hiring but also salary level as well as promotions.  
 
3.1.6 Human Capital Approach 
 
By varying human capital accumulation in women and men, one can 
explain the gender pay gap between those two groups. According to 
Becker (1993), a different approach to human capital investment over the 
course of the lifetime can be explained with cost-utility calculation. Each 
person decides how much resources to invest into his or hers human 
capital, based on it personal utility expectation.   
The idea behind this is that “family oriented” females have smaller utility 
from formal and informal education as well on-the-job training or any other 
form of investment in that direction. There are several reasons why this 
should be valid. Due to children care and therefore resulting breaks / 
discontinuities in their careers, females will benefit less from their human 
capital investment. Having invested the same amount of resources, but 
being able to profit from it for a shorter period, easily explains the lesser 
utility expectation for females. In addition, any professional knowledge 
becomes irrelevant during this period (Blau et al, 2000). Women with family 
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also suffer from less compensation due to “family gap” (Waldfogel, 1998). 
Of course, for the higher paying jobs like CEOs, the costs of staying away 
from work are much higher than for less paying jobs.  
One of the problems with human capital approach is that the amount of 
training one person takes can also depend on the employer and is not 
necessarily his or her sole decision. Any investments in employees obey 
same economical rules like any other investments. Given the fact that 
females more often break their careers due to familiar responsibilities, they 
therefore diminish the return on investment from the perspective of 
employer. As a result, employers tend to hire males for higher positions, 
and offer females less paid ones. Any female is seen as a potential mother 
and even those which have no children and do not to plan to have them 
are being penalized in advance (Wirth, 2002) 
 
3.1.7 (Un)explainable portion of gender pay gap 
 
It is fair to say that anyone to commit more to their job and therefore invest 
more in their human capital should be rewarded accordingly. This pay 
difference is seen as a legitimate gap (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973), as 
long as it is a result of one’s own decisions.   
The problems start when different compensations levels cannot be 
explained with the human capital approach. There are numerous studies 
proving this ( e.g. Blau et al., 2000). In such cases, one has to assume that 
the observed pay gap has to be a direct result of discrimination or some 
other form of prejudice against a certain group.  
It can be assumed that CEOs should have quite similar human capital. 
They also share very high levels of motivation for their job and hence their 
career. Given the established fact that CEO compensation depends on the 
size and profitability of the company, any significant gender difference in 
CEO compensation, while controlling for company characteristics, can be 
seen as unexplainable portion of gender pay gap.   
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3.2 Gender Pay Gap in the US  
 
In the United States, the gender pay gap is measured as the ratio of 
female to male median yearly earnings among full-time, year-round (FTYR) 
workers. The pay data is gathered by the United States Census Bureau26.  
The Census Bureau's annual earnings ratios are an important indicator for 
tracking trends over time. When President Kennedy signed the Equal Pay 
Act in 1963, women earned 59% of the median annual earnings of working 
men. This ratio has been improving until 2001, when it reached 76,3%. 
Since then, it has been steady at high 70’s. In real dollars, it is about 
10,000 USD per year that a female worker gets paid less then her male 
counterpart.  
Based on full-time employee’s hourly earnings, Blau et al. (2000) have 
shown that: 
a) younger females are faring better than their predecessors  
b) over time, the pay gap is widening, meaning that with forthcoming 
age, females earn less than their male colleagues. 
For example, in the year 197827 , the wage ratio for females aged 25-34 
was 0,703, while at the same time for the group of 35-44 this ratio was 
0,589. Ten years later, those same groups now 35-44 and 55-64 had 
respective ratios of 0,687 and 0,647. 
According to the latest “Women at Work” report by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics28, the pay gap is now at 81%. The wage gap has changed at a 
rate of less than a half a penny per year. There are even reports that show 
that in urban areas highly skilled female earn 8% more than their male 
colleagues. This is partially explained by higher college graduation rates. In 
addition, “On an inflation-adjusted basis, earnings for women with college 
degrees have increased by 33 percent since 1979 while those of male 
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 http://www.census.gov/# 
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college graduates have risen by 22 percent.”29 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
Highlights of Women’s Earnings in 2009) 
 
US President Obama signed the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act in 2009. This 
law extended the statute of limitations on cases where a worker found that 
they were receiving discriminatory pay, allowing them to sue and receive 
recompense more than six months after they received the pay. At the 
same time, Paycheck Fairness Act has been stopped in the US Senate. 
This act is basically an extension of the already existing Equal Pay Act 
from 1963.  
                                                 
29
 http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpswom2009.pdf 
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4 Data and summary statistics  
4.1 Data Sources  
 
As already mentioned, the focus of my research is on the gender pay gap 
at the CEO level in a statistically representative sample of selected USA-
based companies listed at the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). The 
source of the data is the website of the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC)30. Every company publicly listed on the NYSE is 
obliged to publish the earnings of their five most highly compensated 
executives in their yearly proxy statements (DEF14A). Out of this form, it 
was easy to identify the CEOs and related data. Data was analysed for the 
period between 199131 until 2008.  
The gender of the CEOs has been determined either according to the title 
(Mr. vs. Ms.) used in the proxy statement or according to the names. There 
have been only few cases where the gender could not be identified for sure 
due to the lack of gender specific title and ambiguous names. Those cases 
have been simply omitted and not included in the sample. In total, there 
are 1367 observations (CEO years) with 225 unique CEOs, 17 out of which 
are females, for a total number of 86 companies. 
One of the most important reasons for concentrating on such a small and 
homogenous group is the basic assumption that there are fewer 
differences in observed characteristics in the human capital of this narrow 
group compared to the highly heterogeneous broad work force. In general, 
it can be assumed that CEOs form a relatively homogenous group of 
people with a similar education level, professional experience, human 
capital and also similar unobserved characteristics like motivation and 
career orientation. Also, data available on CEO pay levels for NYSE listed 
companies is publicly available and much more reliable than similar data 
on their counterparts in other parts of the world.  
Wage-related CEO data I have collected includes the base salary, bonuses 
and other types of cash compensation. In later years, from 2006 on, most 
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 http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html 
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of the companies have introduced “Non-Equity Incentive Plan 
Compensation” instead of bonuses, due to tax advantages. 
Those four components have been used to determine the total cash 
compensation, which I have used for the regression analysis as dependant 
variable. All amounts in the case study have been adjusted to year 2000 
USD level, according to the Consumer Price Index published by the US 
Department of Labour32.  
4.2 Variables 
 
As CEO compensation largely depends on the size and profitability of the 
company, following company-related data were collected for this study:  
• market value (MV);  
• total debt (debt);  
• net income (IB); 
• number of employees (emp);  
• assets (AT) and  
• sales (S).  
In addition to those six collected values which were used to describe the 
company size, two more variables for describing company profitability were 
computed from the data:  
• return on sales (ROS) and  
• return on assets (ROA).  
The abbreviations in brackets are used in tables for simplicity. Also, 4-digit 
industry codes for each company have been collected. 
The terms used are defined as follows:  
• The market value of common stock is the end-of-fiscal year number 
of shares multiplied by the end-of-fiscal year price per share; 
• Total debt is defined as the book value of the debt; 
• Net income is income before extraordinary items (profit after taxes 
and interest); 
• Assets are defined as total assets; 
• Sales are simply defined as total revenue; 
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• Return on sales is defined as net income divided by sales; 
• Return on assets is net income divided by assets 
 
All above variables are reported in millions of USD. Number of employees 
is represented in thousands.  
 
4.2.1 Dummy variables  
 
Prior to conducting the regression analysis, I had to introduce several 
dummy variables. The first one was a dummy for gender, whereby male 
CEOs were denoted with “0” and female ones with “1”.  
In order to control for the year, I have used a set of dummies which were 
denoted Y91, Y92,….Y108. Depending on the subsample used for the 
regression, variables matching the time period covered by the subsample 
were used. In order to control for industry, I have introduced two different 
sets of dummies, both of which were based on Standard Industrial 
Classification33 (SIC) codes. Using the first digit of the SIC code, I have 
created a set of seven variables for the subsample A and another set of six 
variables for the subsample B.  
The first SIC-code digit represents the Industry division, such as 
Manufacturing or Finance.  
The second set was a finer set of dummies, where I have used the first two 
digits representing the Major Groups. I have created a set of 33 (A) / 28 (B) 
dummy variables (I1, I2, … I33). 
According to the rules provided by Filed (2005), the number of 
observations compared to the number of predictors is enough in to obtain a 
reliable regression model as my smallest N = 947. 
“You'll find a lot of rules of thumb floating about, the two most common 
being that you should have 10 cases of data for each predictor in the 
model. or 15 cases of data per predictor, So, with five predictors, you'd 
need 50 or 75 cases respectively.”34   
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“If you want to test the model overall, then he recommends a minimum 
sample size of 50 + 8k, where k is the number of predictors. So, with five 
predictors you'd need a sample size of 50 + 40 = 90. If you want to test the 
individual predictors then he suggests a minimum sample size of 10-* + k, 
so again taking the example of five predictors you'd need a sample size of 
104 + 5 = 109.”35 
All my models were more than satisfying these constraints as number of 
observations was between 1367 and 947, and number of used predictors 
was usually around 10-15 based on which set of dummy variables was 
used 
 
4.3 Regression Equation 
 
General regression equation used in this paper is: 
 
ln (cash) = c + β1 * ln (size) + β2 * ln (profit) + β3 * female + β4*Yi + β5*Ij 
 
Where: 
• ln (cash) is dependent variable.  
• size is company size and is described by either market value, total 
debt, net income, number of employees, assets and / or sales.  
• profit is sompany profitability and is described ROA or ROS  
• female, Y and I are dummy variables as described under 4.2.1. 
• Size of indexes i and j depend on data being used 
 
For example resulting equation for model (3) (Table 3) is: 
 
ln (cash) = c + β1 * ln (assets) + β2 * ln (ROA) + β3 * female + β4*Y1-16  
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4.4 Summary statistics 
4.4.1 Main sample 
 
The main sample contains 1367 observations (CEO years). As can be 
seen in the Table 2, panel (A), the total number of companies in the 
sample is 86. There are 225 unique CEOs. The portion of female CEOs in 
my sample is 8,71% (119 out of 1367 CEO years).  
 
The collected data encompass the period from 1991 to 2008. The number 
of companies in “border” years is significantly smaller than the years in 
between. Some CEOs are represented only once in the sample, and 
maximum representation is 17. The average tenure in the sample is 6,08 
years. The average tenure of female CEO is 7 years, and of male ones 6 
years. This figure differs from corresponding figures reported by Bertrand 
et al. (2000). However, my sample was relatively small compared to 
approximately 8k36 observations in Bertrand’s study and more importantly 
that my measurement of tenure is only based on the number of 
observations which does not reflect any tenure outside of observation 
period, unlike real data from Standard and Poor's ExecuComp data. 
Therefore I have not used tenure in my later regressions model as the 
underlying data might not be fully accurate.. 
 
Additionally, it was not possible to determine for how long the CEOs were 
in their posts prior to 1991, the starting year of the sample, which might 
have skewed the results. Especially given the fact that number of CEOs in 
earlier years in my sample was smaller than in later ones. 
According to the sum of all cash compensations as explained in 4.1., the 
average CEO compensation was 1.283.471 USD. Female CEOs earned 
1.050.142 USD and male ones made 1.305.720 USD on average. This 
gives female to male earning ratio of 80,4%. Naturally, median values were 
slightly lower. 754.980,05 USD for females and 985.785,4 USD for males. 
The resulting pay ratio is 76,5%. Those figures are reported in Table 1, 
panel (A) 
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4.4.2 Subsample A 
 
Out of the 1367 initially collected CEO years, I managed to obtain following 
company-related data for 1104 CEO years: debt, assets, sales and net 
income. This subsample contained 84 companies and 195 unique CEOs. 
The portion of female CEO years remained almost the same (8,70% 
compared to 8,71%). The average tenure for both male and female CEOs 
was reduced slightly from 7 to 6,4 (f) and 6 to 5,6 (m) years. The period 
covered by this subsample was from 1991 to 2006. 
As stated in the Table 1, panel (B) median/average, a female CEO was 
earning 717.055,25 / 960.275,67 USD and the male CEO 1.011.459,25 / 
1.341.317,40 USD. The resulting wage ratios are 70,9% and 71,6% 
respectively. 
If we take any of the company-related figures as an indicator of a 
company´s size, we will notice that, in all of the cases, female CEOs work 
in “smaller” companies.  
The female to male company size ratio is (Table 2, panel (A)):  
• 0,223 when comparing according to sales;  
• 0,088 comparing according to debt;  
• 0,125 when comparing the assets and  
• 0,174 when comparing net income.  
My finding with this subsample confirms the well-established fact that 
“female - run” companies are smaller. 
 
4.4.3 Subsample B 
 
In order to further improve my models, I had to consider additional 
variables, such as market value and the number of employees. 
Unfortunately, this data were available for 947 CEO years only, as it can 
be seen from the Table 1, panel (C), this subsample consists of 72 
companies with 163 unique CEOs, 5,52% out of whom are female. The 
median wage was 713.543,50 USD for female and 1.011.459,25 USD for 
male CEOs. The resulting wage ratio was 70,5%. The respective results 
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using average cash-compensations are 905.830,28 USD for female and 
1.320.307,66 USD for male CEOs. The resulting wage ratio is 68,6%. 
Again, taking any company-related variables and corresponding ratios 
between female and male led companies into account (Table 2, panel (C)), 
it is obvious that females are generally running smaller companies. The 
same findings remain even if we look at other variables, such as market 
value and number of employees.  
In this subsample, female CEOs are making 7,71% of all observations, and  
5,52% of all reported CEOs. Average tenure has risen for female CEOs to 
8,1 years, with total and male tenure almost unchanged.  
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5 Interpretation of Regressions 
 
5.1 General 
 
All monetary variables have been adjusted to year 2000 USD level, 
according to the Consumer Price Index published by the US Department of 
Labour37. The dependent variable is always the logarithm of cash 
compensation. Logarithm of variable sales or assets has been used to 
control for company size. Return on sales and assets have been used to 
control for the company profitability. Depending on the subsample being 
used, different sets of dummy variables have been used to control for year 
and industry as described under 4.2.1. 
The results of regressions are reported in Table 3. The values in brackets 
below the β coefficients are respective standardized error and significance.  
 
5.2 Regression results 
 
Using my initial sample of 1367 observations, I was able to create a 
regression model comprised of only one dummy variable: gender as 
independent variable.  As expected, the β coefficients for female was -
0.262, which represents 23,0% and the R2 value of the model was very low 
at 0,008.  
Due to the fact that I did not have all company data for all 1367 CEO years 
inside of the main sample, I had to use subsamples in order to further 
control for company size and profitability.  
In my next model (2), I have used assets for controlling for company size. 
Surprisingly, the female coefficient was positive (0,118), which would imply 
that female CEO earn 12,6 % more than male counterparts in companies 
of the same size. I have replaced assets with sales (model 3) in order to 
avoid any mistakes in data I might have, but the results were again positive 
(0,040 / 4,1%). In both cases, those results were significant and R2 values 
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were around 0,540. Using market value as an independent variable, with 
the constant sample size of 947, created similar results (4).  
 
Adding ROS or ROA to the regression equation had almost no impact on 
the female coefficient. Respective β values for ROS and ROA were 
insignificant. Those 4 regression models are not reported in the Table 3. 
In my next step, I have controlled for the year, and the results changed 
here. Female coefficients fell to 0,082 / 8,5 % (5) and 0,081 / 8,4 % (6), but 
were still positive. Respective p-values were around 0,175. 
Controlling further for industries using both sets for the SIC division and the 
major industry group had almost no impact on the value of female β, but it 
became insignificant as can be seen from the representative regression 
(7). Additionally, in models using ROS to control for profitability, it was also 
insignificant. 
Similar set of models was created using sales as company-size control. 
Again, the results for β female were positive and mainly insignificant. The 
same applies to ROS values. In some cases, coefficients from ROS and 
ROA were negative, which is very hard to interpret.  
Given the fact that model (8) included most variables in my research it was 
also statically the most meaningful one. Size was controlled by sales and 
profitability by ROA, which indirectly measures the impact of net profit and 
assets. In addition, at the same time I also controlled for year and industry. 
Female coefficient was still positive at 0,118 / 12,5 %, R2 was 0,704, but 
the ROA coefficient was slightly insignificant at 0,126. 
After re-checking all the data for any rounding-, scale- or similar mistakes, I 
have looked at similar researches, especially at Bertrand et al. (2000) and 
Yurtoglu et al. (2007). There was a significant difference between their 
data sets and the one I have used in regard to female-to-male company 
size ratios. As can be seen in Table 2, panel (C), my size ratios are 0,114 if 
I check for assets, 0,207 for sales, 0,181 for market value and 0,342 for the 
number of employees respectively. Compared to ratios used by Yurtoglu38 
which are 1,011 for assets and 0,925 for sales, my findings are much 
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lower. The same is valid for the data provided by Bertrand39: 0,725 for 
assets, 0,546 for sales, 0,668 for market value and 0,538 for number of 
employees.  
Given the fact that their numbers of observations were much higher, I have 
to conclude that my data set in regard to the company size is inferior, even 
if the number of observations in my sample should be sufficient and 
statistically significant, as already stated under 4.3.  
Assuming the size ratio is 0 and we only control for gender, which would 
imply that both male and female work in equally large companies. The 
resulting β female would be equal to the raw gender pay ratio. If the 
company size ratio was equal to the gender pay ratio, β female would be 
equal 0 and that would imply that there is no gender pay gap while 
controlling for the company size. Equally, when female CEOs work in 
smaller companies, their compensation level is also proportionally lower,  
In order for β female to be negative, the company size ratio had to be at 
least the same as the pay ratio. In cases where the pay ratio is smaller 
than the size ratio, a female CEO would get paid the same amount if she 
was working in a bigger company. Another way to interpret this is to say 
that, while working in a same-sized company, a male CEO would earn 
more than his female counterpart.  
Due to the fact that my raw gender-pay ratio is 0,68640 and that company 
size ratios are smaller (e.g. sales 0,207), it is clear that my β female had to 
be positive.  
In cases represented by my data set, where the size ratio is much smaller 
than the pay ratio, the implications, also confirmed by the reported 
regression models are that a female CEO earns more than a male CEO in 
a company of similar size. It should be stressed out one more time that 
these findings are valid only while controlling for the company size and 
gender exclusively. Although these results contradict the general research 
results, they are statistically correct.  
In my next step, I have decided to abolish the company size from my 
regression models and control for company profitability, year and industry 
                                                 
39
 Table 2; N = 46600+ 
40
 N = 947 
 33 
 
only. As can been see in the Table 3, models (9) – (12), β female is around 
-0,370 / -31% for N = 1104 and around -0,320 / -27% for N = 947. In all 
four cases, I have used the industry dummy for major groups (I33 and I28). 
 
5.3 Further observations 
 
In order to improve my models even further, I would need to collect 
additional data, especially in regard to company size. Other valuable data 
would include the age of the CEOs or their real tenure. According to my 
research, female CEOs have slightly longer tenures then the male ones. 
This is not completely consistent with some other sources which use a 
higher number of observations, but the difference in both cases is not too 
large (Cappelli et al., 2004).  
Another improvement of models would for sure be to investigate the impact 
of personal characteristics of CEOs such as tenure, marital status, 
previous experience or tenure. With such extended data set one could 
measure the effects of “motherhood penalty”, “family gap” and human 
capital on gender pay gap.  
The age of the CEOs can also play an important role in determining the 
effects on the gender pay gap, but I was, unfortunately, not able to collect 
this data. As reported in a study by Bell (2005), female CEOs are younger 
than their male counterparts. This can be explained by the fact that 
females have just started “conquering” the CEO ranks and therefore their 
average age is lower. Similar findings on the importance of age and tenure 
in explain the gender gap for CEOs have been confirmed by Bertrand et al. 
(2000)41. 
 
Naturally, a full sample of companies with additional variables would give a 
much better picture and significantly improve the statistical models, but 
such data is usually only available commercially. 
 
Another phenomenon I briefly looked at is the so called “glass ceiling”. 
Some people also (mis)use the term “sticky floors”, which is quite similar 
                                                 
41
 Table 6 
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and has been explained under 3.1.1. In my sample, there are 119 / 8,71% 
female CEO observations (Table 1, panel (A)). Various authors report 
similar percentage figures, depending on the time-range covered by 
studies, those figures vary. According to the US federal Glass Ceiling 
Commission (1995)42 only 3-5% of senior managers are female. Bertrand 
et al. (2000) report figures between 1,29 and 3,39 %, depending on years. 
In Table 4, there is an obvious increase in number of female CEO within 
the sample over the years. This is proof that females are still 
underrepresented at CEO positions but are slowly gaining ground. Same is 
true for all higher ranking positions.  
 
As already stated before, Bell (2005) tried to prove the link between the 
gender of board members and CEOs and other high ranking officers. She 
also looks into the level of payment in comparison with male-led 
companies. “Women executives in women-led firms earn between 10-20% 
more than comparable executive women in male-led firms and are 
between 3-18% more likely to be among the highest five paid executives in 
these firms as well. The paper thereby provides strong empirical evidence 
that women leaders are associated with positive outcomes for women 
executives in substantive and important ways.” Collecting data on gender 
of the board members and especially of the members of “compensation 
committees” would be an interesting area to look into.  
 
Looking at the average compensation trend over time, it has started at 
around 1.000k in 1991 and has increased steadily until 2000 when it 
reached 1.460k. This increase rate cannot, however, be observed in 
following years. “While bonus and other payments remained essentially 
constant, this drop in base salary was accompanied by a huge increase in 
the fraction of compensation based on stock options. There is now some 
evidence that this trend has stopped in 2001 and somewhat reversed 
afterwards (Economist, 2006).43” Due to the fact that I have only controlled 
                                                 
42
 Recommendations of the Federal Glass Ceiling Commission Washington, D.C. 
November 1995 http://www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/history/reich/reports/ceiling2.pdf 
43
 Via Yurtoglu et al (2007) 
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for cash compensations, without looking into stock options, this statement 
cannot be fully verified. 
 
From Table 5, panel (B) it is also visible that the composition of cash 
compensation is quite similar for both male and female CEOs. Base Salary 
is at around 50%, Bonuses are at about 38% and other compensation is at 
the level of 12%. 
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6 Concluding remarks 
 
As I have demonstrated with my research as well, females are still 
underrepresented at CEO positions in U.S. publicly traded companies, but 
are slowly gaining ground. The percentage of female CEO is still in the 
one-digit range. However, younger females may be moving into business 
quickly and successfully more than previous generations. According to 
Forbes44, being a CEO is the best paid female job.  
Overwhelming research shows that females are still earning less than their 
male colleagues and this is also valid for a highly homogenous group like 
CEOs. The gap might be closing but it is still far from extinct. Numerous 
models try to explain the reasons for this obvious disparity but the causes 
of the gender pay gap are still not fully explained.  Consequently, there can 
be no comprehensive recommendations for its bridging.  
Various efforts by governments and law makers, which admittedly have 
increased over the years, are still not resulting in full equality. The most 
striking fact is that: “No country in the world has achieved gender equality. 
The three highest ranking countries—Iceland, Finland and Norway—have 
closed a little over 80% of their gender gaps, while the lowest ranking 
country—Yemen—has closed only around 46% of its gender gap.”45 
 
  
                                                 
44
 http://www.forbes.com/2009/06/25/top-paying-jobs-forbes-woman-careers-salary-
employment.html 
45
 Gender global report for 2009 
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8 Appendix: Tables 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics on CEOs' compensation and characteristics 
  
 
Panel (A) 
 All   Male   Female   p-value 
         
Compensation  1.283.471   1.305.720   1.050.142   0,022 
  
(31.381)   (33.366)   (84.054)     
Salary  634.762   643.319   545.024   0,012 
  
(11.021)   (11.533)   (36.552)     
Bonus  497.940   509.515   376.544   0,086 
  
(21.820)   (23.482)   (45.487)     
Other  150.769   152.885   128.574   0,497 
  
(10.094)   (10.749)   (27.167)     
         
N  1367  1248  119  8,71% 
CEO  225  208  17  7,56% 
Tenure  6,08  6,00  7,00   
         
Panel (B) 
 All   Male   Female   p-value 
         
Compensation  1.308.183   1.341.317   960.276   0,003 
  
(35.613)   (38.144)   (77.495)     
Salary  639.667   652.674   503.098   0,000 
  
(12.067)   (12.796)   (31.649)     
Bonus  534.000   551.000   361.000   0,034 
  
(25.160)   (27.160)   (45.250)     
Other  134.263   137.890   96.173   0,259 
  
(10.419)   (11.194)   (23.056)     
         
N  1104  1008  96  8,70% 
CEO  195  180  15  7,69% 
Tenure  5,66  5,60  6,40   
         
Panel (C) 
 All   Male   Female   p-value 
         
Compensation  1.288.357   1.320.308   905.830   0,001 
  
(33.799)   (35.817)   (79.257)     
Salary  644.014   656.889   489.857   0,001 
  
(13.136)   (13.817)   (36.636)     
Bonus  511.958   526.019   343.606   0,019 
  
(20.721)   (22.066)   (45.519)     
Other  132.000   137.000   72.400   0,131 
  
(11.490)   (12.330)   (19.720)     
         
N  947  874  73  7,71% 
CEO  163  154  9  5,52% 
Tenure  5,81  5,68  8,11   
 
Notes: All data reported in real 2000 dollars adjusted using the US consumer price index. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. The p-value originates from a two-sided t-test testing 
the significance of the difference between the means of respective variables for female 
and male CEOs. Panels differ in number of observations. 
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Table 2: Summary statistics on firm characteristics 
 
         
Panel (A) 
 All   Male   Female   % of N 
         
N  1367  1248  119  8,71% 
Unique Firms  86       
    
              
 
        
Panel (B) 
 All   Male   Female   % of N 
         
N  1104  1008  96  8,70% 
Unique Firms  84       
         
  All   Male   Female   p-value 
         
Assets  5.335   5.780   658   0,001 
  
(445)   (485)   (82)     
Sales  4.465   4.788   1.068   0,000 
  
(287)   (312)   (163)     
Debt  1.381   1.500   132   0,003 
  
(128)   (140)   (31)     
Net Income  301   324   57   0,002 
  
(25)   (27)   (15)     
    
              
  
           
 
Panel (C) 
 All   Male   Female   % of N 
         
N  947  874  73  7,71% 
Unique Firms  72       
         
  All   Male   Female   p-value 
         
Assets  5.206   5.588   638   0,006 
  
(480)   (518)   (91)     
Sales  4.512   4.806   994   0,001 
  
(319)   (343)   (178)     
Debt  1.340   1.442   116   0,011 
  
(140)   (151)   (34)     
Net Income  308   328   61   0,007 
  
(27)   (29)   (17)     
Market Value  7.831   8.358   1.514   0,003 
  
(607)   (654)   (392)     
Employees  21   22   7   0,001 
  
(1)   (1)   (1)     
    
            
  
 
Notes: All monetary data reported in real 2000 dollars adjusted using the US consumer 
price index. Standard errors are in parentheses. The p-value originates from a two-sided t-
test testing the significance of the mean difference of the respective variable between 
female and male. 
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Table 3: Regressions – Summary: Dependent variable: Log of Total Compensation 
                            
  
( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 ) ( 7 ) ( 8 ) ( 9 ) ( 10 ) ( 11 ) ( 12 ) 
              
R2  0,008 0,544 0,535 0,568 0,553 0,557 0,635 0,704 0,436 0,418 0,462 0,456 
N  1367 1104 1104 947 1104 1104 947 947 1104 1104 947 947 
Const.  13,778 11,229 11,223 11,584 11,309 11,353 11,250 11,704 14,408 14,486 14,395 14,451 
  (0,023) (0,074) (0,076) (0,066) (0,096) (0,096) (0,098) (0,122) (0,092) (0,092) (0,095) (0,094) 
  (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Female  -0,262 0,118 0,040 0,021 0,082 0,081 0,060 0,118 -0,371 -0,372 -0,323 -0,314 
  (0,078) (0,059) (0,059) (0,063) (0,060) (0,060) (0,061) (0,062) (0,074) (0,075) (0,081) (0,081) 
  (0,001) (0,046) (0,499) (0,738) (0,171) (0,176) (0,332) (0,058) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Pay Gap  -23,0% 12,5% 4,1% 2,1% 8,5% 8,4% 6,2% 12,5% -31,0% -31,1% -27,6% -26,9% 
  
            
Asset  
 0,355   0,350 0,342 0,366      
  
 (0,010)   (0,010) (0,010) (0,011)      
  
 (0,000)   (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)      
Sale  
  0,357     0,344     
  
  (0,010)     (0,013)     
  
  (0,000)     (0,000)     
Market  
   0,305         
Value  
   (0,009)         
  
   (0,000)         
ROA  
     0,712 0,708 0,388 2,137  2,141  
  
     (0,217) (0,247) (0,253) (0,258)  (0,330)  
  
     (0,001) (0,004) (0,126) (0,000)  (0,000)  
ROS  
    0,094     0,975  1,336 
  
    (0,131)     (0,167)  (0,241) 
  
    (0,471)     (0,000)  (0,000) 
  
            
Year  
    yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry  
      I6 I28 I33 I33 I28 I28 
                            
 
Notes: Values in parenthesis are standard error and significance respectively. I6 denotes dummy for SIC Industry Division. I33 (I28) denotes dummy for SIC 
Industry Major Group. β female transformed (e^ β - 1) is Pay Gap and shows percentage female CEOs earn less / more than male ones.    
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Table 4: Female/Male Compensation and Respective Ratios Over Time  
 
     
Panel (A) Male  Female  F/M ratio 
                  
Year  Total Salary Bonus Other  Total Salary Bonus Other  Total Salary Bonus Other  # CEO 
                  
1991  999.787 586.987 391.318 21.481             
1992  965.276 596.916 301.737 66.623             
1993  995.167 578.134 331.383 85.650  571.997 340.260 118.142 113.595  0,575 0,342 0,119 0,114  0,037 
1994  1.115.503 593.491 435.909 86.103  424.905 301.063 112.739 11.102  0,381 0,270 0,101 0,010  0,060 
1995  1.154.098 608.810 406.933 138.355  494.016 318.620 164.371 11.024  0,428 0,276 0,142 0,010  0,060 
1996  1.184.745 625.840 453.133 105.771  701.017 351.782 156.000 193.235  0,592 0,297 0,132 0,163  0,071 
1997  1.178.764 599.051 451.259 128.454  654.322 433.597 191.240 29.485  0,555 0,368 0,162 0,025  0,083 
1998  1.367.290 638.325 507.712 221.252  1.155.256 719.245 408.954 27.057  0,845 0,526 0,299 0,020  0,105 
1999  1.414.311 674.581 606.404 133.326  817.041 508.990 275.992 32.059  0,578 0,360 0,195 0,023  0,105 
2000  1.493.369 662.206 691.082 140.081  1.176.206 569.308 565.420 41.479  0,788 0,381 0,379 0,028  0,105 
2001  1.264.709 649.867 468.573 146.270  1.249.731 621.591 505.541 122.599  0,988 0,491 0,400 0,097  0,093 
2002  1.428.552 659.500 553.647 215.405  1.143.555 571.313 378.412 193.830  0,800 0,400 0,265 0,136  0,116 
2003  1.408.381 652.644 559.510 196.227  892.503 520.208 332.481 39.814  0,634 0,369 0,236 0,028  0,128 
2004  1.854.625 678.360 932.729 243.535  1.150.979 555.960 525.653 69.366  0,621 0,300 0,283 0,037  0,140 
2005  1.844.918 688.167 1.000.011 156.740  1.225.170 556.201 449.723 219.246  0,664 0,301 0,244 0,119  0,145 
2006  1.174.237 691.818 276.660 205.759  1.859.550 745.707 831.036 282.807  1,584 0,635 0,708 0,241  0,083 
2007  1.240.657 762.266 214.927 263.464  1.389.557 695.544 227.382 466.631  1,120 0,561 0,183 0,376  0,092 
2008  1.230.885 645.386 377.186 208.313  2.274.071 1.013.294 0 1.260.777  1,848 0,823 0,000 1,024  0,053 
  1.305.720 643.319 509.515 152.885  1.050.142 545.024 376.544 128.574  0,804 0,417 0,288 0,098  0,087 
                  
Panel (B) Total Salary Bonus Other   Salary Bonus Other        
                  
All  1.283.471 634.762 497.940 150.769   49,46% 38,80% 11,75%        
Male  1.305.720 643.319 509.515 152.885   49,27% 39,02% 11,71%        
Female  1.050.142 545.024 376.544 128.574   51,90% 35,86% 12,24%        
 
Notes: All monetary data reported in real 2000 dollars adjusted using the US consumer price index. Total (compensation) is the sum of salary, bonus and other 
compensation in the current year. #CEO ratio shows the fraction of female CEOs out of all CEOs (N = 1367).  
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